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The paper reviews agricultural development in the fifteen former Soviet republics over the 
period 1965-1997. Production functions are estimated and productivity differences and changes 
calculated. Large differences were found in terms of productivity and growth between the 
republics. The differences grew after 1990 reflecting variation in reform policies.   
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Agricultural Output and Productivity in Former Soviet Republics 
Zvi Lerman,  Yoav Kislev, Alon Kriss, and David Biton 
 
Introduction and Summary 
This paper is an examination, in two parts, of productivity and changes in agriculture in 
the 15 new independent states that up to 1991 constituted the republics of the Soviet Union. The 
first part presents what may be called a conventional production function analysis for the Soviet 
period before 1990. The second part deals with the post-Soviet period of transition, 1991-98, 
covering both the collapse associated with the dissolution of the USSR and the recovery that has 
begun to emerge. The report is preliminary in several ways. First, transition is still an on-going 
process, and it is safe to expect that accumulated information and experience will change, in the 
coming years, the lessons of its analysis. Second, information on the former Soviet economies is 
often more problematic than on agricultural sectors of other countries, but the available data may 
be expected to improve as studies accumulate. Last but not least, we have not exhausted the 
analysis, even within the current state on knowledge. We plan to continue and return with 
expanded reports. 
Although the pre-1991 economic literature usually treated Soviet agriculture as a single 
monolithic entity
1, the agricultural sectors in the 15 republics differed significantly due to 
natural, social, and political factors. Because of these differences, labor productivity￿output per 
worker￿in the best performing republic was 2.5 times higher than in the agriculturally least 
productive republic. As wide as this gap may seem, it was much smaller than the corresponding 
                                                 
1   An exception is McConnell Brooks, but she was interested in comparing agriculture in the 
Soviet republics to areas with similar climates outside USSR, while we are mainly examining the 
differences between the republics.  
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gap between agricultural productivity in non-Soviet countries. While productivity was 
comparatively low, input use in the Soviet republics was on a par with agriculture in the 
industrialized countries, but again technical change was smaller. 
After 1991 agricultural production collapsed in all 15 new independent states, probably 
both because of reduction in demand as real incomes fell and because of the disruptions in 
support services that accompanied the elimination of central controls. The collapse was so 
dramatic that agricultural production did not recover to its pre-1990 levels even six or seven 
years later. The reduction in output was accompanied by declines in the use of factors of 
production. The utilization of most purchased inputs decreased; labor left agriculture in some of 
the republics, while in others, particularly the Muslim countries of Central Asia, agricultural 
employment increased. Decreasing output and changing input utilization affected efficiency. 
Some countries improved the efficiency of agricultural production, while in others efficiency 
deteriorated during transition. Paucity of data precludes a systematic statistical analysis of the 
transition period, but visual examination suggests that policies￿land individualization, structural 
changes in services and institutions￿and the performance of the non-agricultural sectors have 
strongly affected recovery and efficiency gains (or losses) in agriculture. 
 
The Soviet Period 
Agriculture in the Soviet Union 
The world￿s Industrial Revolution was accompanied by a no less dramatic agricultural 
revolution￿food is now in abundant supply and we eat more and better than our forefathers did 
(Fogel). The Soviet Union inherited from the Czarist Empire a farm sector that produced, before 
World War I, enough food for domestic consumption and for export. Production expanded under  
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the Soviet regime, but nature, impatience, and human blunders combined to prevent agriculture 
from developing at the rate necessary to satisfy the needs of an economy that was pursuing rapid 
industrialization and urbanization. 
   Large parts of the former Soviet Union the vast tundra and coniferous forests of 
northern Russia and Siberiaare not fit for agriculture. Farming is therefore practiced in a 
relatively small part of the former USSR: in its European regions, in the narrow belt stretching 
across all of southern Siberia, in Transcaucasia, and in Central Asia. However, with few 
exceptions, farming conditions are not favorable even in these food-producing parts. Most of the 
grain-growing areas of Russia and Ukraine are colder than many farming regions in the world. 
Further east and south, Central Asia is a dry desert. Despite their huge area, the grain-producing 
regions of the Soviet Union are mostly located in a narrow climate zone and are similarly 
affected by changes in weather. This similarity is the principal explanation for the comparatively 
large yield variations and food-supply fluctuations that characterized Soviet agriculture. 
Three times shortage of food reached famine proportions in the Soviet Union: in 1918-21 
in the wake of the revolution and war communism, in 1932-33 at the height of collectivization, 
and in 1946-47 in the aftermath of World War II. Many perished in each instance. The Soviet 
regime, particularly under Stalin, reacted with coercion to the inability of the farm sector to 
supply the growing urban population with adequate amounts of food.  Farm products were 
forcibly procured from the farmers and, under the stress, miracle cures were embraced: 
collectivization, economies of scale, Lysenko￿s biology, and even an attempt to change the 
climate.  
Many reforms in agriculture were attempted after Stalin￿higher producer prices, heavy 
investment, cultivation of virgin lands, consolidation of collective farms, food imports￿but the  
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basic structure was not changed, shortages prevailed, productivity was judged low, and the 
problem of agriculture remained a central national issue. Later it was even suggested (Johnson) 
that inflated food subsidies were one of the major causes for the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
in 1991.  
The Fifteen Republics 
Of the fifteen former Soviet republics, eight are northern, located in the temperate planes 
(the Baltics and the core republics; see Table 1) and seven are southern, located in Transcaucasia 
and Central Asia. As the data in Table 1 show, the two groups differ in more than just location 
and climate. 
Typically, the northern populations had low rates of growth, less than 1% per year, while 
the southern populations grew much faster, with yearly rates exceeding 2% in the Muslim 
republics of Central Asia (Table 1). The republics also differed in income. In the late 1980s, on 
the eve of transition, GNP per capita in the northern republics was twice as high as in their 
southern counterparts. The northern republics fell in the World Bank￿s group of Higher Middle 
income countries, while the southern republics were at the level of the Lower Middle income 
countries. There was considerable inequality among the Soviet republics, and yet all of them fell 
in the Middle Income group. The income differences among the Soviet republics were thus 
substantially smaller than the differences among non-Soviet countries, ranging from Low to 
High Income economies. This attribute of the Soviet system, namely that the dispersion of the 15 
republics was less than the dispersion of countries outside the USSR, will recur again and again 
as we continue our review. 
In terms of labor allocation in the 1980s, only Russia could be considered an industrial 
country, with less than 14% of the labor force in agriculture. In the other countries, agriculture  
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had higher shares in employment, with the highest in the southern republics (Moldova, the 
southernmost member of the northern group, had 37% of labor in agriculture).  
The republics differed also in the nature of their agriculture. The northern republics had 
relatively high shares of livestock in agricultural product and no irrigation to speak of (except 
Moldova). The southern republics had less livestock and, located as they were in a relatively dry 
climate, most of their arable land was irrigated. 
Productivity in the Soviet Republics 
The period of our analysis, dictated by the availability of data, covers the years 1965-
1990.  Productivity differences between the republics and changes over time were estimated in 
the framework of a Cobb-Douglas production function. The variables in the analysis are reported 
in Table 2 (in the Appendix we comment on the data and their sources.). Labor productivity￿
output per agricultural worker￿was highest in the Baltics and lowest in Central Asia. Land 
endowments were highest in Kazakhstan and Russia, the principal grain-producing republics. In 
the southern republics, the land-to-labor ratio was comparatively low, but most of the area was 
irrigated. The Baltics had the highest capital-to-labor ratio (measured by horsepower of 
machines) and more livestock per worker than any of the republics, except the sheep-herding 
Kyrgyzstan. It seems that fertilizers were allocated in Soviet agriculture according to the 
principle of comparative advantage: the more intensively cultivated areas, among them the Baltic 
republics and the irrigated lands of Central Asia, received more fertilizers than the extensively 
cultivated grain-producing planes. 
Although the Soviet republics differed substantially in labor productivity, these 
differences were smaller than among non-Soviet countries. Table 3 reports productivity and 
factor allocation in the Hayami and Ruttan sample (see Appendix for comments). Output per  
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agricultural worker (here measured in wheat units) was almost four times higher in the 
industrialized countries than in Latin America. The differences between the newly settled 
countries and Asian agriculture were even greater.
2 Inputs were measured in Tables 2 and 3 in 
essentially the same units. It is perhaps surprising to find that intensity of all factors￿land, 
machinery, livestock, and fertilizers￿in the Soviet republics was on a par with industrialized 
countries in the Hayami and Ruttan sample. The frequently reported poor labor productivity in 
the Soviet Union may have been a reflection of inefficient use of other inputs, machinery in 
particular (Johnson and McConnell Brooks, Medvedev).  
As is typical of less-developed countries, agricultural labor in Central Asia was still 
growing (in absolute values) over the period 1965-1990 (not in the table), while in the European 
republics it was decreasing. Both demography and general economic conditions were responsible 
for the differences in trends in agricultural labor. The Central Asian republics had comparatively 
high birth rates and faster increases of the labor force. Combined with relatively smaller 
manufacturing and service sectors (as reflected by higher shares of labor in agriculture in Table 
1), they lacked the ability to create employment opportunities for the growing numbers of 
workers.  
Production Functions and Technology 
The estimated production function is of the Cobb-Douglas type with republic and time 
dummies added in some of the regressions. Because of space limitations, we do not report in 
detail the estimated technology￿the contribution of the factors of production￿and show only 
                                                 
2    McConnell Brooks reports that the average output per worker measured in wheat units for the 
15 Soviet republics was less than one-tenth of the corresponding average for 11 American states 
and 3 Canadian provinces with comparable climates.   
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the two regressions that constitute the basis for Table 4 (see the notes to the table). The table 
itself reports republic and time effects. All estimates are for the 26-year period 1965-90.  
In family farming, output per agricultural worker is a good indicator of family income. In 
Soviet agriculture, output was created both in large-scale collective farms and in small household 
plots akin to family farms. Family disposable income therefore was not always a simple function 
of output. Still, income was related to output, even if in a roundabout way. We therefore focused 
our attention on output per agricultural worker, and the regressions for Table 4 were estimated at 
the per-worker level. They were estimated separately for the northern and the southern republics. 
The specification in the two groups differed in that irrigation was included as a separate variable 
only in the regression for the southern republics, where the land variable was accordingly the 
residual dry land. 
The republic effects in the regressions are reported in Table 4 for the northern republics 
relative to Russia and for the southern republics relative to Georgia. In the Soviet era, all the 
northern republics (except Kazakhstan) were more productive than Russia. This was particularly 
true of Moldova, a republic endowed with fertile soil and warm weather. Among the southern 
republics, Georgia was the most productive, with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan the least 
productive. In a pooled regression of all 15 republics, Georgia￿s coefficient was 25.8% lower 
than Russia￿s. This indicates a large difference in agricultural productivity between the northern 
and the southern republics. 
Three columns in Table 4 present growth accounting by Solow￿s method for the 26-year 
period 1965-90. Take Lithuania as an example. Agricultural output grew over the 26-year period 
by 1.51% per year and technical change was 0.03% per year. The growth of the conventional 
inputs (labor and those in the regression) was thus 1.48% per year, accounting for 98% of the  
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growth in agricultural output. The contribution of the conventional inputs to output was generally 
close to 100%, and for many republics￿those with negative technical change￿it was higher 
than 100%. Comparison to Table 3 shows that, in terms of the components of growth accounting, 
the Soviet republics behaved like the less-developed countries. They were far from the 
performance of agriculture in the newly settled and industrialized countries. 
To summarize the discussion of the Soviet period, we note that substantial differences 
were found between the northern and the southern republics and, in particular, between their 
agricultural sectors. But, as a rule, these differences were smaller than the gaps in corresponding 
magnitudes between countries in the non-Soviet world. We also found that technological change 
in agriculture in the Soviet republics was small or even negative.  
 
The Post-Soviet Period 
This part describes the developments in agriculture in the 15 former Soviet republics in 
the post-Soviet period and attempts to explain the changes that have occurred. One of the 
questions that we ask is, to what extent specific features observed in the Soviet era can also be 
identified as affecting agriculture in the transition countries after 1991. 
Production and Efficiency 
The dissolution of the USSR in 1991 was naturally followed by an economic upheaval 
from which the former Soviet republics (by now independent states) have yet to recover. In 
Estonia, the per-capita GNP in 1997 was 21% lower than in the three last years of the Soviet era 
(Table 5, column 1); the corresponding magnitude for Moldova was 71%.  
Agricultural production also collapsed. Column 2 in Table 5 reports the immediate 
change in agriculture between 1989 and 1992, when central planning ceased to function in the  
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former USSR
3. Output fell dramatically, more so in the northern countries than in the southern, 
although there were exception in each group: Kazakhstan among the northern countries recorded 
growth of agricultural output and in Georgia, a southerner, output fell by more than 40% (in part 
due to the vicious civil war that raged in the country at that time). Output changes were 
accompanied by labor movements. Agricultural employment grew in all countries but three 
(column 3). People evidently returned to the land when the urban economy became uncertain, as 
land reform policies, wherever implemented, afforded access to subsistence farming. The 
returning workers contributed to production and mitigated the agricultural decline.  
Armenia is a striking example. The country suffered a devastating earthquake in 1988, 
which destroyed much of its industry and infrastructure. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with 
Azerbaijan triggered a regional blockade that disrupted critical imports of energy and other 
inputs. The non-agricultural sectors were in total disarray in the early 1990s, and labor migrated 
to rural areas. The government responded to the growth of the rural labor force by implementing 
a swift and irrevocable land reform, which involved redistribution of most of the arable land 
from collective farms to individuals. As a result agricultural employment in Armenia increased 
by 75% between 1989 and 1992 while output declined by just 7% ￿ less than in any other 
southern country (except Turkmenistan).  
As output dropped and employment increased, labor productivity￿output per worker￿
declined, in Armenia and elsewhere. The declines in output in the initial period 1990-92 were so 
large that labor productivity declined even in countries where labor was leaving agriculture 
(Estonia, for example): production fell proportionately more than the number of workers.   
                                                 
3   Two-point comparisons of production in agriculture may be inaccurate because of weather 
variation, but at this stage our analysis does not allow for output fluctuations.  
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The second period examined in Table 5, 1992-97, was to be a period of recovery. 
However, agricultural output continued to decline (column 4), except in Georgia, where the 
political situation stabilized after the civil war. Still, even if a real recovery cannot be identified, 
a mitigation of the deteriorating trend is discernible: in Estonia, Lithuania, and Belarus labor exit 
from agriculture exceeded the decline in output (column 5) and labor productivity improved. As 
the changes were not uniform, the dispersion of performance in agriculture increased markedly. 
Even disregarding Estonia as a possible outlier, the coefficient of variation of labor productivity 
increased between 1990 (not in the table) and 1998 by more than 60%.  
Labor movement and productivity are important indicators of changes in welfare, but 
labor is just one of the factors of production. The use of other factors also decreased, particularly 
the use of fertilizers, livestock, and machinery (agricultural land was naturally less affected). 
Column 6 reports our calculation of the change in the quantity index of a composite basket of all 
inputs from 1992 to 1997. The inputs are those listed in Table 2, and to calculate the index we 
weighted the changes in each input by the corresponding production function coefficients (as 
shown in the notes to Table 4). Estonia and Kazakhstan reduced input use by more than 40%. 
The northern countries in general reduced input use more than the southern countries, where 
input use actually increased in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan￿mostly due to the increased labor 
employment in these two Muslim countries with fast growing populations.  
The residual difference between the growth of output and the growth of inputs is 
generally attributed to technical change; in other words, it represents efficiency improvements 
(column 7). The term efficiency is used here with some reservation. In many cases, prices rose 
drastically following deregulation and producers could not afford to use purchased inputs at the 
previous levels. In other cases, feed, fertilizers, or spare parts may have been simply unavailable  
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in any price. Thus, not all changes in input use reflected rational economic calculations. Indeed, 
we should not expect to have optimal input combinations under conditions of rapid transition. 
Still, a smaller decrease of output, relative to inputs, indicates improved efficiency and 
productivity. We see from column 7 that, in the northern countries, efficiency generally 
improved￿primarily due to reduced use of inputs, not gains in output (Latvia and Kazakhstan 
are the only exceptions that show decrease in efficiency). Among the southern countries, 
efficiency improved by 22% and 32% in Armenia and Georgia, respectively, the two countries 
that resolutely switched from large-scale collective agriculture to small-scale individual farming. 
Efficiency deteriorated in Central Asia, at least partly due to the fast population growth that 
created a need to absorb labor in agriculture. 
Food Supply 
Agricultural production declined markedly after the disintegration of the USSR both in 
countries where efficiency decreased and in countries that enjoyed improvements in agricultural 
productivity. It has often been said (e.g., Csaki and Fock) that domestic production was replaced 
by imported food. In Table 6 (column 1) we have attempted to evaluate the ratio of import 
surplus to agricultural output for the five-year period 1992-96. As column 1 shows, only Estonia 
and Belarus had import surpluses that could cover a significant part of the reduction in output 
between 1989 and 1997. However, even in Estonia, the country with the highest import surplus 
ratio, output fell over this period by 52%, while import surplus was only 37% of the lower, post-
1991 output.  In the other countries, import surplus was much smaller; Moldova, Kazakhstan, 
and Uzbekistan even recorded export surpluses.  
If these estimates are correct, food supply must have actually declined in the 15 former 
Soviet republics. As indicated in the introduction, the qualification ￿if,￿ while appropriate in any  
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empirical analysis, applies here more than elsewhere. The transformation of the Soviet Union 
into 15 new independent states changed their economies and price structures significantly. 
Consequently, consumers may have enjoyed in recent years a wider variety and better quality of 
goods than in the past even if, by conventional accounting, food supply was reduced (Kostova 
Huffman and Johnson). However, a reduction of basic food supply is indicated also by another 
set of data. Column 2 presents the average caloric intake for 1992-96 from FAO food balances. 
Twelve of the 15 former Soviet republics had caloric intakes of less than 3000 calories per capita 
per day in the post-1990 period, and the average for the former USSR was 2660 calories per 
capita per day.  A decade earlier, the average intake for the Soviet Union was 3203 calories per 
capita per day. By these numbers, food supply indeed must have decreased substantially in the 
former Soviet republics.  
According to the same FAO food balances, the caloric intake in 1992-96 was 3202 
calories per capita per day for the developed countries and 2601 calories for the developing 
countries (the 15 former Soviet republics are in neither of these groups). By column 2, food 
intake in the northern republics was between the values for the developing and the developed 
countries, while the population in the southern republics ate less than the average of the world￿s 
developing economies. 
Economic Environment and Factors Affecting Recovery 
We turn now to examine the economic environment and the factors that could have 
affected agricultural development in the 15 former Soviet republics. Data limitations preclude a 
systematic statistical analysis and we will have to rely on comparisons of numbers. The 
immediate effects of the traumatic changes in 1990-91 are recorded in columns 1, 2, and 3 of 
Table 5; the following years, 1992-97, form a period when recovery, or at least mitigation of the  
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initial decline, could be expected to have taken place (this period is reflected by the rest of the 
columns in Table 5). 
The first question we ask is whether the recovery was affected by the productivity of 
agriculture in the Soviet republics before 1991. Except for Armenia and Georgia, which 
dramatically shifted to individual agriculture while recovering from natural disaster and war 
devastation, the southern republics registered reduction in efficiency (column 7 in Table 5). The 
more productive agricultural sectors in the northern countries recovered more than the relatively 
less efficient ones.  
Our estimates, reported in Table 4 for the northern and the southern countries separately, 
indicated marked differences in agricultural productivity across the republics in the Soviet 
period. Republic coefficients from a pooled regression utilizing data for both the northern and 
the southern countries are presented in column 8 of Table 5. Productivity in the southern 
republics was estimated to be substantially lower than in the northern ones.  Comparing to 
column 7 in the table, we see that, in general, countries that showed relatively high performance 
in the pre-1990 era (as judged by the republic dummies) registered efficiency improvements after 
1992 (the Baltics). The under-performers from the pre-1990 period (Central Asian countries) 
registered continued efficiency declines after 1992; while the core republics retained their 
middle-of-the-road position in terms of performance and efficiency after 1992. As indicated, 
above and also below, Georgia and Armenia were special cases. 
Each of the 15 new independent states modified to a different extent the economic 
structure of collective agriculture inherited from the Soviet Union. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 6 
report the percentage of agricultural land in individual use and the share of individual 
agricultural production for 1997. Estonia, Lithuania, Armenia, and Georgia individualized land  
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use and showed efficiency gains (privatization did not help Latvia, though). Southern countries 
that have not implemented significant land individualization register the largest reductions in 
efficiency. Another indicator is the World Bank￿s ECA policy and institutional reform index in 
column 5 of Table 6 (Csaki and Fock). This is a weighted average of scores on a scale of 1 to 10 
for policies that affect the economic environment of agriculture, including trade and price 
liberalization, land reform, privatization of services and supplies, development of rural finance 
and public institutions. The northern countries, especially the Baltics, received comparatively 
high scores; the southern countries scored lower. The index is highly correlated with efficiency 
gains in column 7 of Table 5. Thus, implemented policies affected recovery. 
As we have seen, efficiency and recovery involve both production and utilization of 
inputs. A major input is labor. Modern agriculture in the industrialized countries is characterized 
by exit of labor and intensification of the use of machines and purchased inputs. Agriculture in 
the former Soviet republics contracted essentially in all its dimensions; arable land was the only 
variable that did not decline (and even here we find an exception: Kazakhstan ￿decommissioned￿ 
large areas of marginal productivity, reducing its arable land resources by about 20% since 
1992). We cannot explain all the changes, but we may attempt to shed some light on labor exit. 
For labor to leave agriculture remuneration elsewhere must be higher and there need be jobs in 
other sectors. Remuneration is indicated in column 6 of Table 6 as the ratio of value added per 
worker in the non-agricultural sectors of the economy to value added in agriculture. In the Baltic 
states, Russia, and Kazakhstan income outside agriculture was substantially higher than in 
agriculture; in the other countries, agriculture provided close or even better income opportunities. 
The share of non-agricultural sectors in GDP (column 7 in Table 6) may serve as a proxy for the 
probability to find employment in town. This share is higher in the northern countries than in the  
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southern ones. Labor exited from agriculture (columns 2, 4 in Table 5) wherever it was 
motivated by higher relative income and by availability of employment opportunities. 
These observations raise a question to which we have already made reference in passing. 
As indicated in column 1 of Table 5, income fell drastically in all 15 countries, and the reduction 
of income probably reflects economic upheavals. One would expect such changes, particularly if 
abrupt, to be accompanied by significant increases in unemployment. Yet the World Bank￿s 
World Development Indicators show only single digit rates of unemployment (or even less) in 
the 15 former Soviet republics. It is therefore impossible to incorporate unemployment and its 
effects in the analysis, but we have to qualify the discussion by noting that unemployment and 
under-employment are hard to measure in transition economies and their absence from the 
official records does not mean that they do not exist. 
 
Appendix 
The data for the productivity analysis of the 15 Soviet republics (Tables 2 and 4) were 
collected from USSR statistical yearbooks for various years, supplemented, where necessary, by 
statistical yearbooks of the different republics. The data for the analysis reported in Table 3 are 
from Hayami and Ruttan, extended to cover all agricultural labor (male and female) and the year 
1990 using information from ILO and FAO.  
The variables for the 15 Soviet republics (Tables 2 and 4) were defined and constructed 
as in Hayami and Ruttan with three major modifications: labor is both male and female workers; 
land is arable (pastures are not included); livestock does not include draft animals. In the 
southern Soviet republics, irrigated land and dry land were taken as separate variables. 
  
  16
The groups of Hayami and Ruttan countries in Table 3 are defined as follows: 
Newly settled: United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand; 
Industrialized: United Kingdom, Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, Norway, The Netherlands, Italy, 
Ireland, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (Federal Republic), Greece, Belgium, Austria, 
Israel, Japan. 
Latin America: Venezuela, Paraguay, Peru, Argentine, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Colombia; 
Egypt+: Egypt, Libya, Mauritius; 
Asia: Sri Lanka, Philippines, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh; 
Others: South Africa, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Portugal, Syria. 
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  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Baltics         
Estonia 1.5 0.77 4646 17 69 1
Latvia 2.5 0.62 4582 16 70 1
Lithuania 3.4 0.92 2902 25 67 2
Core 
Russia 138.3 0.68 3827 14 61 5
Belarus 9.6 0.64 2637 24 57 2
Moldova 4.0 0.90 2200 37 36 17
Ukraine 50.0 0.37 3389 21 54 8
Kazakhstan 14.8 1.19 2161 23 59 6
Transcaucasia 
Armenia 3.1 1.35 2168 20 51 61
Georgia 5.1 0.77 2295 28 32 58
Azerbaijan 6.1 1.55 1564 33 32 87
Central Asia 
Kyrgyzstan 3.6 1.97 1397 32 57 74
Tajikistan 3.9 3.01 1033 43 32 86
Turkmenistan 2.8 2.51 2001 40 34 105
Uzbekistan 15.8 2.58 1310 38 33 93
Source: GNP per capita from World Bank Word Development Indicators database (1999 edition). All other data 






















  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Baltics        
Estonia 12.5 7.3 0.1 38.4 7.0 247
Latvia 10.3 6.7 0.1 38.0 6.5 238
Lithuania 11.1 6.6 0.1 35.4 7.0 235
Core        
Russia 8.1 12.0 0.5 28.7 6.6 79
Belarus 8.8 5.0 0.1 20.9 5.8 266
Moldova 6.0 2.5 0.3 14.7 2.5 197
Ukraine 7.9 6.0 0.3 18.6 5.1 126
Kazakhstan 7.7 20.7 1.2 35.7 9.0 22
Transcaucasia        
Armenia 6.1 2.3 1.3 10.8 5.6 191
Georgia 5.2 1.2 0.7 5.4 3.4 280
Azerbaijan 6.2 2.2 2.0 9.0 4.6 195
Central Asia        
Kyrgyzstan 5.7 3.1 2.3 14.0 7.2 182
Tajikistan 5.4 1.8 1.5 10.6 4.0 273
Turkmenistan 5.3 2.6 2.5 12.7 3.9 243
Uzbekistan 5.1 2.1 1.9 11.6 2.7 283
Source: USSR statistical yearbooks (Goskomstat SSSR) and calculations by Kriss. 
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Egypt +  Asia  Other 
Output and inputs, 1979-81 averages  
Output  (wheat  units/worker)  180.5 53.4 14.1  2.9  2.7 17.4 
Arable  Land  (hectares/worker)  78.7 7.9 4.9 1.4 0.6 7.5 
Capital  (horsepower/worker)  91.6 28.8 1.27 0.13 3.12 5.94 
Livestock  (head/worker)  48.8  10.5 9.4 0.6 1.4 6.0 
Fertilizers (kg per hectare)  80.1  219.1  38.9  128.0  24.4  52.6 
Growth accounting, 1960-90        
Output  (% per year)  1.96  1.84  3.04  2.44  2.78  2.84 
Technical Change (% per year)  1.01  1.18  -0.59  -0.61  -2.53  0.02 




Table 4. Productivity Differences and Growth for the Fifteen Soviet Republics, 1965-90 
Growth accounting   
Republic 
dummies, %  Output,  
% per year 
Technical change,  
% per year 
Share of conventional 
inputs, % 
 1  2  3  4 
Northern republics 
Lithuania  37.4  1.51 0.03 98.0 
Latvia 25.2  1.32  -0.14  110.6 
Estonia 39.0  1.38  -0.24  117.4 
Russia  0.0  1.63 0.12 92.6 
Ukraine  28.4  1.67 0.31 77.8 
Belarus 30.8  1.93  -0.06  103.1 
Moldova 65.9  1.71  -0.12  107.0 
Kazakhstan  -23.8  2.98 0.87 70.8 
Southern republics 
Georgia 0.0  2.01  -0.08  104.0 
Azerbaijan -32.5  3.71  -0.84  122.6 
Armenia -17.6  0.84  -0.16  119.0 
Uzbekistan -49.2  3.87  -0.23  105.9 
Kyrgyzstan -39.0  2.88  -0.40  113.9 
Tajikistan -35.9  3.19  -0.58  118.2 
Turkmenistan  -55.5  5.24 0.07 98.7 
Source: Kriss and authors￿ calculations. 
Notes: The production functions were estimated using per-worker data with republic dummies (an asterisk indicates 
estimates significantly different from zero).  
Northern republics: Output=-0.796*+0.257*xLand+0.453*xLivestock+0.043xCapital+0.143*xFertilizers 
(R
2=0.962). 

























  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Baltics    
Estonia  -20.6 -32.1 -19.3 -28.9 -47.7 -43.1 14.2 28.7
Latvia  -38.6 -29.4 10.0 -45.3 0.2 -39.2 -6.1 11.1
Lithuania -30.6  -34.8 17.2  -6.1 -14.9 -24.4 18.3 20.0
Core    
Russia  -41.6 -16.7 3.2 -24.7 -12.5 -32.1 7.4 0.0
Belarus  -22.4 -20.9 -6.2 -17.7 -20.6 -20.5 2.9 11.2
Moldova  -70.9 -34.8 4.6 -16.8 -6.8 -19.3 2.4 -5.0
Ukraine  -57.2 -22.8 2.4 -26.6 1.2 -29.2 2.5 4.6
Kazakhstan -40.9  6.8 15.5  -47.5 -16.4 -42.3 -5.2 -3.3
Transcaucasia    
Armenia  -58.7 -7.3 74.9 -1.5 13.8 -24.4 22.9 -22.1
Georgia -70.0  -40.2 -2.6  24.0 87.1 -8.8 32.9 -25.8
Azerbaijan  -68.5 -24.0 11.2 -33.4 -14.2 -29.6 -3.9 -18.1
Central Asia    
Kyrgyzstan -41.5  -14.5 21.3  -6.8 13.7 -5.2 -1.7 -15.5
Tajikistan  -69.1 -27.0 12.5 -28.8 24.1 -17.3 -11.5 -14.4
Turkmenistan -67.9 -5.9 11.7  -22.2 10.8 7.2 -29.4 -16.7
Uzbekistan  -25.8 -1.6 24.3 -4.5 -2.7 6.2 -10.7 -18.8
Sources: column 1, World Bank￿s World Development Indicators database; columns 2-5, Goskomstat SNG and 
official country statistics for the Baltics; column 6, authors￿ calculation using the sources of columns 2-5 and FAO; 
column 7, authors￿ calculations; column 8, Kriss. 
Note: Efficiency calculated as the difference between column 4 and column 6 (changes in agricultural output and 
input use between 1992-97). Republic dummies are relative to Russia, based on a pooled regression of 15 republics. 
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Table 6. Characteristics of the Former Soviet Republics in the Post-Soviet Period 
Food supply  Policy reforms  Non-agricultural sector 






















  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Baltics    
Estonia 37 2705 63 n.a. 7.8 171  92
Latvia 7 2962 95 n.a. 7.6 142  90
Lithuania -3 2950 67 n.a. 7.0 132  88
Core   
Russia 24 2913 11 55 6.0 172  93
Belarus 10 3177 16 45 1.6 94  83
Moldova -21 2925 27 51 5.8 87  69
Ukraine 6 3044 17 53 5.4 101  83
Kazakhstan -3 3155 20 38 5.8 170  87
Transcaucasia   
Armenia 6 1930 32 98 7.4 23  58
Georgia 8 2152 24 76 6.2 52  64
Azerbaijan 11 2151 9 63 5.0 129  76
Central Asia   
Kyrgyzstan 1 2358 23 59 5.8 49  55
Tajikistan n.a. 2274 7 39 3.8 n.a.  n.a.
Turkmenistan n.a. 2547 0.3 30 1.8 n.a.  n.a.
Uzbekistan -5 2646 4 52 2.2 103  69
Sources: columns 1-2, FAO and authors￿ calculations; columns 3-4, Goskomstat SNG and official country statistics 
for the Baltics; column 5, Csaki and Fock; columns 6-7, World Bank￿s World Development Indicators database and 
authors￿ calculations. 
Note: The import surplus ratio in column 1 was calculated by dividing import surplus in dollars (FAO) by 
agricultural output (value added in agriculture from World Bank￿s World Development Indicators database 
multiplied by 1.67, reflecting the assumption that value added was 60% of output). 
 